In sensor networks, nodes cooperatively work to collect data and forward it to the final destination.
wormhole attacks. Wireless reprogramming protocols ( [26] [25] ) suffer from high overhead. Other domain protocols also ( [42] [43] ) also has high overhead.
Hu et. al. [37] describe the rushing attack in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols and propose a countermeasure through dynamic secure neighbor detection, secure route delegation, and randomized route request forwarding. This protocol depends on a very strict time propagation delay measurement to detect neighbors. Neighbor detection is done on the fly and for every packet exchanged which may affect the efficiency and the ability of using it in highly constrained sensor networks. Hu and Evans [36] propose a solution to the wormhole attacks using specialized hardware; directional antennas TESLA [28] and µTSLA [44] , use an authentication technique that uses periodic and delayed key disclosure. Delayed authentication (as in TESLA, and µTESLA) is not appropriate since a packet would be delayed at each node in the path from the source to the destination. Moreover, since each node has to buffer the traffic packets it has received until they are authenticated, delayed authentication will lead to high storage requirement at every node. However, SRPS uses an authentication technique that does not need a large storage by a voiding the pre-computation of a hash sequence of keys and storing them in advance for the whole life time of the sensor. Also SRPS authentication doesn't require any kind of time synchronization because the authentication is limited to the neighborhood and all the neighbors receive the data at the same time, so there is no chance for any of them to forge messages and broadcast them on behalf of the real source.
Some routing protocols (e.g. [27] , [29] ) use non-repeating increasing counters for the route request and route reply packet identifier while others use random numbers (e.g. [13] , [37] ). However, these ways for the packet identifier add vulnerabilities to the routing protocol. If an increasing sequence number is used, an attacker can track the sequence number of the route requests from any source, say S, to any destination, say D, and then launches a DoS attack by flooding the network with a higher number. This will prevent S and D from discovering any new routes between them, since all the nodes in the network will think that this is an old request and just drop it. On the other hand, if a random number is used, an attacker can easily replay old attacks since the destination can't distinguish between an old valid request and a new one using the random number alone.
Both of these choices fail to countermeasure the malicious inclusion of compromised nodes in an already established route [39] . The success of this attack facilitates the success of other attacks such as the blackhole attacks and the selective forwarding attacks. A compromised node can include itself in an already established route by sending a valid route request (correct sequence number or random number) to a node already in the route. Figure 1 shows an example of how can a malicious node includes itself in an already established route in a protocol like DSDV [28] . The malicious node, M, sends to Y a route request with a source sequence number greater than the current one. In response to that, Y changes the route to A to point to M instead of X. Then M sends to X a route reply packet with a destination sequence number greater than the current one. X changes its route to B to point to M instead of Y. Thus M succeeds in including itself in the route easily. To countermeasure this attack, there must exist a method by which an intermediate node can verify the authenticity of the route request and the route reply. ARAN [39] proposes a solution using public key cryptography with centralized trusted authority and signatures. The route initiator signs the route request packet and every intermediate node verifies the signature of the initiator verifies the signature of the previous hop, replaces the signature of the previous hop with its own signature. Ariadne [11] suggests three methods to provide authenticity to the intermediate nodes; using pair-wise symmetric keys in which the route request/reply must be individually authenticated to each intermediate node and to destination/source, using TESLA protocol which provides authenticate public broadcasting, and uses digital signatures. These solutions for intermediate node authentication are very expensive in terms of the computational and bandwidth overhead which makes them impractical for a highly limited resources sensor networks.
Neighbor watch has been used as an enhancement of the watch dog approach [34] , which was used to negate the effect on throughput of misbehaving nodes that agree to forward packets but do not. But watch dog suffers from problems such as ambiguous collisions and receiver collisions. A malicious watcher could blackmail a good node by claiming that it did not forward a packet while it is really did, or it may not receive the message due to collision. Another problem could occur when the watcher is not able to detect whether the receiver forwards the packet or not if the watcher got jammed by the time when the receiver forwards. Neighbor watch mitigates these problems by not limiting the watch to the packets' sender but asking other neighbor nodes to work as watchers.
Description of SRPS
Overview: Immediately after the deployment of the sensors in the network, the initial phase (Section 3.2) starts, this provides each node with a list of neighbors, a commitment key for each neighbor, and the neighbors of each neighbors (first and second hop neighbors). This neighbor list is built using neighbor detection protocols (Section 3.1). Anode that needs to communication with another node checks its routing table; if a route does not exist, it enters a route discovery phase (Section 3.3). In the route discovery phase, the route request initiator floods the network with a route request which propagates to the destination. The destination unicasts a route reply back to the initiator which stores the route in its routing table, leaves the route discovery phase, and starts using the established route. Each intermediate node in path of the route reply verifies the authenticity of the route reply (Section 3.4), updates its routing table and forwards the packet to the next hop. Each node that forwards the route request or the route reply proves its identity to its neighbors through MAC authentication using its commitment key (Section 3.2).
Each node that can overhear the route reply monitors the behavior of the nodes involved in forwarding the route reply for suspicious actions, such as fabrication, change, or dropping (Section 3.5).
Some applications (e.g. secure data transmission) require multiple disjoint paths to exist between the source and the destination, Section 3.6 explains how SRPS provides disjoint multiple paths. If an established route breaks, the first intermediate node that notices the break sends a route error packet back to source, in a process called route maintenance (Section 3.7).
Assumptions:
We assume that the links are bi-directional; which means that if a node A can hear node B then node B can hear node A. Also we assume the existence of an underlying pair-wise key management protocol ( [44] , [45] , [46] ). Any two nodes willing to establish a route between them are assumed to have a joint shared secret key, distributed using the underlying key-management protocol.
Finally we assume that there are no malicious nodes during the setup phase of the network. We assume a none-mobile dynamic topology sensor network, i.e. the nodes do not move but the roles they play in the network (e.g. sensing role, cluster head, control node, data aggregator …) are changed.
Attack Model: A full cooperative Byzantine attack model is considered in which compromised nodes can collude to do whatever they can to subvert the functionality of the routing protocol. A node only trusts itself and the main base station.
Neighbor Detection
Neighborhood detection can be achieved through multiple ways:
Centralized information from the base station that knows the topology of the network and keeps updating that topology in mobile networks. This can be amortized with protocols that introduce control nodes or cluster heads for scalability and efficiency.
Naïve detection by broadcasting a HELLO packet. But this method is vulnerable to wormhole attacks where powerful compromised nodes can fool other nodes to believe that they are neighbors even though they may be multiple hops away. Wormhole prevention techniques can be used to prevent this attack [36] .
Directional-antenna-based neighborhood detection which is used as well to prevent Wormhole attacks [36] .
Propagation delay neighborhood detection techniques where packet delay of certain control packets is used to measure the distance to a neighbor [37] .
Under the assumptions that we consider, the neighborhood discovery is done only once at the setup phase and is guaranteed to be secure. So we will use the second method to establish the neighbor list of each node, which will be simple and safe since it is built at the time when no malicious nodes are assumed to exist. SRPS however, could be easily extended to dynamic and mobile networks if it is augmented with one of the other three neighbor detection techniques mentioned above ( 0, 0, and 0).
After the node gets the list of its direct neighbor, it exchanges this list with each neighbor so that each node stores its direct neighbors and the neighbors of each neighbor.
Initial Setup
As soon as the sensor nodes are spread in the field, each node starts sending a HELLO message which is replied to by all the nodes that hear it. Both the HELLO packet and its reply are small packets that contain only the address of the packet initiator. For each reply to the HELLO packet, the initiator of the HELLO packet adds the source of the reply to its neighbor list. This processes is performed only once in the whole lifetime of the sensor network, so the associated overhead is affordable. Upon completing, each sensor node i have a list of its neighbors, which we denote by R i .
In addition to the knowledge of the neighbors, each node needs a mechanism to authenticate each one of them. To achieve this, each sensor node, say S, distributes a commitment key to every node in R S . This can be done in two ways. In the first, the commitment key is exchanged during the setup phase using the HELLO messages. Each HELLO massage is augmented with a commitment key (K commit(S) ) from the sender (S) to each neighbor who stores the commitment before replying to the HELLO. In the second, the commitment key is exchanged using the underlying key management protocol. As a result, each node, say S, ends up having the commitments of its neighbors as well as its own commitment sequence seed
The commitment key is derived from the commitment seed as K Commit(S) = F (t) (K seed(S) ), where F is a one-way collision resistant function and t is the length of the commitment string. The value of t depends on the amount of available memory. It can be as small as two and as big as desired. However, the longer the sequence the lower the communication overhead incurred by commitment renewal (Section 3.4.3) and the larger the amount of memory required. So the tradeoff is between the communications overhead versus the storage requirement. To overcome the storage requirement, the commitment key can be derived on demand by applying the one-way function to the commitment seed (K seed(A) ) multiple times as needed.
For example, the j th authentication key = F (t-j) (). So the tradeoff becomes between the memory requirement and the computational cost.
When a node B wants to broadcast an authentic packet to its neighbors, it first generates the next authentication key as K auth(B) = F(last known authentication key), and uses it to generate a MAC over the packet. The first authentication key = F (K seed(S) ). B then broadcasts the packet to its neighbors. After all the neighbors got the packet, B broadcasts its current authentication key, K auth (B) , that is used to authenticate the previously sent packet. When B releases K auth(B) , each neighbor, say A, verifies the validity of the key by running the hash function over it and comparing the result with the stored commitment for B. If the key is valid, A stores it as the new commitment for B and uses it to verify the authenticity of the packet it received from B.
An alternative neighbor authentication could be achieved if we assume that the hardware addresses can't be controlled by the attacker. If we set the ID of each node to be the hash value of the hardware address (ID X = F(Hardware_address_of X)), then a neighbor node can find the ID of the source of the packet by calculating it from the hardware address of the source. This also has the benefit of smaller packet overhead since the ID of the source of the packet need not to be included in the packet header.
Route Discovery
When a node, say S, needs to discover a route to a destination, say D, it generates a route discovery packet (RDP) that contains: a flag to indicate that it is a route request packet (REQ), the sender ID (ID S ), the destination ID (ID D ), a unique sequence number (SN), and a sequence number verification (SNV), see 
Intermediate Node Verification
Since the route discovery is achieved by flooding, a mechanism is required to limit the amount of flooding through the network. Each node only needs to broadcast the same request only once and it must suppress any further request copies. This can be achieved by attaching a unique identifier in the header of each new route request from a certain node. The identifier is also required to distinguish new requests from old replayed ones. SRPS uses a novel idea for the identifier to achieve intermediate node authentication of the route request and the route reply through a practical light weight protocol that prevents a malicious node from including itself in an already established routes.
Request-Reply Verification
Let SN be an increasing unique sequence number that is incremented with every new route request issued by a node. Let S be the route request source, D be the route request destination, and X be an 
The First Route Request
The route request initiator (A): 
The i th Route Request
The route request initiator (A):
1. Broadcasts a route request holding the current sequence number SN and a
An intermediate node (B):
2. Stores:
, n i SN v − − in addition to the information explained in Section 3.3.
The route request destination (D):
3. Sends back to S a route reply holding SN and
An intermediate node (B):
4. Verifies that 
Hash Sequence Renewal Protocol
Let S be the route request source, D the route request destination, and B an intermediate node in the path between S and D. 
Secure Disjoint Multi-path Discovery
Multipath protocols which look for maximally disjoint paths [49] are vulnerable to the tunneling attack which is a special case of the wormhole attack. In tunneling attack two malicious nodes collaborate to tunnel routing messages to one another so that a destination may falsely believes that two paths are disjoint while they share multiple nodes.
To help establish disjoint routes to the destination we use an idea inspired by Hu et. al. [37] which is used to prevent rushing attacks. In almost all the previously mentioned on demand ad-hoc and sensor network routing protocols, an intermediate node forwards the first announcement of a certain request and suppresses any following announcements. In SRPS, as we mentioned earlier, each node, say B, waits for a random a mount of time before forwarding the announcement that it heard. During that waiting time, it buffers all the announcements of the same request. At the same time, B listens to any neighbor, say E, whose timer times out and forwards one of the announcements he got, if that announcement comes from the same source as any one of those that B has in its buffer, then that announcement is suppressed from the buffer and is excluded from the random selection process done by B. Finally, when B's counter timeout, or when it gets a number of announcements greater than certain threshold value, it picks a random announcement from its buffer and forwards it. An example is shown in Figure 4 , let B receives route requests from nodes X, Y, and Z, and let E is a neighbor of B who also receives from X, and let the route request from X is the first to arrive to both B and E, Figure 4 (a). If nodes B and E forward the first route request they got and drop the others they both will forward the route request they got from X as shown in Figure 4 (b) which results in joint paths in node X. However, using the our technique, assuming that the timer of E runs out before that of B and that E broadcasts the message it received from X, then B will drop the X's packet. When B's timer runs out, it selects at random one of the Y, and Z packets and broadcasts it. The result paths are disjoint as shown in Figure 4 (c).
When an intermediate node, say B, receives more than one reply for the same route discovery, which happens when two none-neighbor nodes forward the route request from the same previous hop. Consider for example the scenario shown in Figure 5 . Node B had forwarded the route request it got from node A.
Both of the none-neighbor nodes X and Y received and forwarded the route request they got from B. 
(i) if B is an honest node, it will drop the second route reply, (ii) if B is malicious and
A is an honest node, even if B forwards the second route reply to A, in attempt to include itself in both routes, A will drop it, (iii) if B is malicious and A is malicious, and B forwards the route reply to A, this moves us recursively to step (i) where node A takes the role of node B, and the next hop from A plays the role of node A, (iv) if B is malicious and it forwards the second route reply to another node, say α, B will succeed in including it self in two "different routes". To countermeasure this attack, we use the neighbor watch. When a node, say β, overhears a neighbor forwarding a route reply it will save the route reply information in its watch buffer for a certain time τ. If α overhears the same neighbor, B, forwarding the same route reply again within τ, it will accuse that neighbor as trying to include himself in multiple disjoint routes, and thus delete any routing entry it may have between the source and destination that includes B. Thus in Figure 5 , node A upon overhearing node B forwarding the next route reply will delete the first route reply from its routing table and thus preventing B from being in two routes. τ is selected to be the same as the threshold time after which the initiator of the route request will no longer accept any new route replies.
The initiator of the route discovery gives a priority level for each route reply it receives; the priority that we propose is based on the minimum delay. So the faster reply will be considered the highest priority one, even it may come through a relatively longer route (more number of hops). The rationale behind that is a longer route with less congestion or less malicious behavior is better than a shorter and congested route.
Route Maintenance
If an already established route between the source, S, and the destination, D, is broken either naturally; e.g. a node on the route exhausted its power, or maliciously by a compromised node in the path dropping data packets, then S has three options. The first is to revert to an alternate disjoint route if it has one. The second is to initiate a new route discovery process. The third is to ask the nodes at the edges of the faulty link to handle the problem and discover alternate routes to pass the traffic between them. For example if the route contains S-B-~~~~ -X-Y-Z-~~~-R, and if Y is the faulty node, then S asks X to find an alternate route to Z and ask both X and Z to update their routing tables to S and D accordingly.
The ability of S to discover the broken path depends on the nature of the connection between S and D.
If S is used to receive an acknowledgment through this route it will notice the problem by failing to receive the appropriate acknowledgments. If D expects to receive data from S and that data did not arrive, D may request the data from S through a different route since it may guess the problem. If neighbor monitoring (Section 3.5) of data packet is enabled, the guards of the broken link will detect the failure and report it to S.
Security Analysis
In this section we will show how SRPS mitigates known attacks against the routing infrastructure.
Conjecture: SRPS route discovery does not allow any route to be established through a wormhole, Sybil, Sinkhole, rushing, or HELLO flood attacks.
Conjecture#1: SRPS does not allow any alteration, or replaying of route information
Proof: The route request and the route reply are both authenticated by the source and the destination of the route using a shared key known only to them. No malicious node can generate or change a valid route request that can be accepted by the destination, and no malicious node can generate or change a route reply that can be accepted by the initiator of the corresponding route request. The increasing sequence number associated with each route request-reply pair prevents replaying of old route requests and replies. The intermediate node verification prevents any number of colluding malicious nodes from including a malicious node in an already established route using the SN and the SNV as explained in For example, assume a path is established between A and B as shown in Figure 6 . Let M be a malicious node that tries to include itself in this path. For M to be able to do so it must convince X to change its routing table to point to M for packet destined to B, and convince A to change its routing table to point to M for packet destined to A. So M has to generate a valid route request or replay an old request, other wise the intermediate nodes will ignore the request since it will not be correctly verified. If M replays an old route request, the target B will discover that through the old sequence number that it holds and thus ignore the request so X and A will not receive a reply and thus will not update their routing tables. For M to generate a valid request it must know the key shared between A and B, which is provably infeasible unless either A or B or both are compromised, in that case there is no need even to try this attack. M as well may try to offer a faster service to A by claiming that it is one hop away from B, may be by using a high power transmission, but neither A nor B will believe it because it is not in the neighbor list of either of them.
Conjecture#2
: SRPS does not allow any malicious node to establish a Sinkhole.
Proof:
In a Sinkhole, an attacker tries to attract all the traffic from a particular area through a malicious node by including the malicious node in the route to all nodes in that area. If succeeded, the attacker can launch other attacks such as blackhole (blocking) or selective forwarding of data traffic. This attack typically works by making the malicious node look especially attractive for the surrounding nodes.
For example an attacker could replay or spoof a high quality route to the destination. Some countermeasures of this attack rely on an end-to-end acknowledgments containing reliability or latency information. However, a powerful attacker who has enough power to transmit the packet directly to the target could easily defeat these countermeasures.
SRPS is not vulnerable to the sinkhole attack, due to the local knowledge of each node and due to intermediate node verification. A malicious node can't interact with any non-neighbor node; the malicious node communication will be rejected because it is not a neighbor node. This means that a malicious node can't shout loudly to convince far nodes that they are only one hop a way from it and thus attracting their traffic to it. Also a malicious node can't include it self in an established route or spoof or alter or replay any route information as proved in conjecture#1.
Conjecture#3: SRPS does not allow any malicious node to spoof routing information.
Proof: a malicious node, say M, has two possibilities to be able to spoof routing information; (i) generate the routing information and claim the ID of the victim node, say S. Any neighbor of M that does not have S as a neighbor will automatically reject the spoofed data. Any neighbor of M that is also a neighbor of S will also reject the data since it will not be verified correctly using the neighborhood authentication mechanism introduced in Section 3.2. (ii) Generate the routing information and claim that it has received it from S through another node, say B. If B is not a neighbor to M, then all the neighbors of M will automatically reject the spoofed data. If B is a neighbor to M, then the guards of the link between M and be will detect the forge since they do not have the corresponding data (from B to M) in their watching buffer.
Conjecture#4: SRPS does not allow any malicious node to launch a Sybil attack for routing purposes.
Proof: In Sybil attack, a malicious node presents multiple identities to the network [22] . This attack is especially destructive for protocols that are used to discover disjoint multiple routes; a malicious node can include itself in multiple different routes by presenting different identities to other nodes. As proved in Conjecture#3, SRPS prevents ID spoofing, so no malicious node can present an identity other than its own to the network and thus can't launch the Sybil attack.
Conjecture#5: SRPS does not allow any colluding malicious nodes to launch a Wormhole attack.
Proof: The wormhole attack [35] , [48] [35] involves two distant colluding malicious nodes to understate their distance from each other. It is more effective when used to create sinkholes or artificial links that attract traffic. This attack can be launched either by using an out-of-bound channel available only to the attacker or by tunneling messages received in one part of the network and replaying them in a different part. It is so effective that it can be launched even without having access to any cryptographic keys. work in SRPS, the two colluding nodes must be compromised nodes owning legitimate cryptographic keys. We consider the scenarios by which wormhole attack could be launched. Two colluding nodes use an out-of-band invisible channel to the underlying sensors or packet encapsulation to tunnel routing information between them, Figure 7 . When M 1 hears the route request packet initiated by S, it directs it to M 2 . M 2 rebroadcasts the packet to its neighbors and eventually it reaches the target D. D then generates a route reply and sends it back until it reaches M 2 . M 2 sends the route reply back to M 1 using the unseen channel between them. M 1 forwards the route reply back to S and it must append to the header the ID of the previous hop from which it got the route reply. M 1 has two choices, either to say the truth and append the ID of M 2 as the previous hop or lie and append the ID of one of its neighbors, say Z, as the previous hop. In the first choice node S will reject the route reply because it knows that M 2 is not a neighbor to M 1 , so M 2 can't be the previous hop from M 1 , also all the neighbors of M 1 will detect the malicious activity of M 1 . In the second case, all the guards of the link between Z and M 1 (Z,α, and β) will detect B as forging the route reply since they don't have the corresponding information from Z in their watch buffer. So in both cases M 1 will fail to pass the route reply and thus the wormhole will not succeed.
Conjecture#6: SRPS prevents rushing attacks.
Proof: In the rushing attack, an adversary who hears the route request broadcast rushes to rebroadcast the request in attempt to make the route request broadcasted by him the first to reach all the neighbors of the destination. If the attacker succeeds in doing that, then any route discovered by this route discovery will include a hop through the attacker. As a result the attacker can easily launch a DOS attack and prevent the source from discovering any usable routes to the destination.
SRPS inherently implement and use rushing attack prevention (RAP) [37] for discovery of multiple disjoint routes, Section 3.6. An intermediate node will not forward the first route request it got (may be from a rushing malicious node), but it will collect a number of route requests from different neighbors and randomly select one of them to rebroadcast.
SRPS analysis

Coverage analysis
In this Section, we characterize the probability of miss detection and false detection as the network density increases and the detection confidence index, γ, varies. Results provide some interesting insight. Based on the performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol [51] , we assume that each packet collides with constant and independent probability, P C , i.e. P C is the probability of a collision seen by a packet being transmitted on the channel. Thus, each guard receives a packet with probability 1 C P α = − . Assume that µ malicious activities occur within a certain time window, T. Assume that a guard must detect β malicious activities to cause the Mal C for a node to cross the threshold, and thus, generates an alert. Then, the alert probability at a guard is given by ( )
. The probability p γ that γ of the guards detect the malicious node is given by
The probability that at least γ of the guards generate an alert, and thus detect the malicious node is given by ( ) ( ) Figure 9 (a) shows the probability of detecting the wormhole using µ = 7, β=5, γ =3, and P C = 0.05 when the number of neighbors is 3, and the number of compromised nodes M = 2. P C is assumed to increase linearly with the number of neighbors. Since the number of guards increases as the number of neighbors increases, the probability of detection increases since it becomes easier to get the degree of confidence required. However, the collision probability also increases as the number of neighbors increases, and thus the probability of detection starts to fall rapidly beyond a point. Figure 12 , shows for the same µ, β, and P C the probability of wormhole detection as a function of γ when NB = 15 and M = 2.
As the detection confidence index increases, the probability of detection decreases.
As shown in Figure 8(b) , a guard G will not detect a fabricated packet sent by D, claiming it was received from S, if G experienced a collision at the time when D transmits, thus, the probability of misdetection is given by Thus, the probability of false alarm, P FA , is given by 2 2 (1 ) (1 )
. Assume that S sends to D µ packets, to be forwarded by D, within a certain time window, T, then the probability that β or more of them are falsely detected is given by
, and the probability that γ or more guards send false alarms, leading to the node being flagged malicious, is given by Figure 9 (b) shows the probability of false alarm as a function of the number of nodes for the same parameters as in Figure 9 (a). The non monotonic nature of the plot can be explained as follows. As the number of neighbors increases, so does the number of guards. Initially, this increases the probability that at least γ will miss the packet from S to the guard but not from D to the guard, leading to false detection at these γ guards. But beyond a point, the number of neighbors causes increased contention leading to the probability that both these packets will be missed at the guard and will thus not lead to false detection.
The worst case false alarm probability is negligible (less than 0.3×10-6).
Cost Analysis
In this section we analyze the resource requirements (memory, computation, and communication) of SRPS. To compare and judge these requirements we mention the resources available to one of the most common sensor nodes, the MICA motes. This mote has Atmega128 4 MHZ processor, 4 K byte RAM, 128 K byte flash memory (program memory), 512 K byte nonvolatile memory and 38Kbps bandwidth.
Memory Cost
Each node needs to store the list of neighbors, the neighbors of each neighbor, a commitment key for 10, then the memory requirement will be 1420 byte which is less than 1.5 kilobytes.
Computational Cost
The initiator needs to calculate three MAC values; one for end-to-end verification for the target to verify the authenticity of the source using the shared key between the source and the destination, another is used for neighborhood authentication using the current commitment key, the other is used calculate the RSN using the shared key between the source and the destination over the current sequence number. 
Communication Cost
The source node needs to broadcast the RDP and the key commitment packet. Each intermediate node 
Simulation Results
We use the ns-2 simulation environment to simulate a data exchange protocol, individually in the baseline case without any protection, and also with SRPS. We distribute the nodes randomly over a square sensor field with a fixed average node density. Thus, the sensor field size varies (80×80 m to 204×204 m) with the number of nodes. We assume that the route is evicted from the cache after a timeout period expires (TOut Route ). We simulate the wormhole attack and study its consequences on the network with SRPS and without SRPS. When a malicious node hears a route request, it directs the request to all the other malicious nodes in the network using an out-of-band channel or using packet encapsulation. For packet encapsulation, we assume that the colluding nodes always have a route between them. We simulate the Wormhole attack. We simulate the out-of-band channel by letting the compromised nodes deliver the packets instantaneously to their colluding parties. The wormhole attack exercises the principal features of SRPS, namely, local monitoring and are more difficult to mitigate than other attacks. Hence, we simulate it in preference to other attacks. After a wormhole is established, the nodes drop any data packet going over that wormhole.
Each node acts as a data source and generates data using an exponential random distribution with inter-arrival rate of µ. The destination is chosen at random and is changed using an exponential random distribution with rate ξ. The important input parameters to the simulation are the detection confidence index (γ), the number of neighbors for each node (NB), which is a function of the node density, the number of nodes in the network (N), and the number of compromised nodes (M). The output parameters include the isolation latency, the number of data packets generated, the number of data packet dropped due to the wormhole, the number of routes established, and the number of routes affected by the wormhole. The simulation also accounts for losses due to natural collisions. The isolation latency is calculated from the time a malicious node starts a wormhole attack until it is completely isolated by all of it neighbors. The guards inform all the neighbors of the detected malicious node through multiple unicasts. The output parameters that we present here are obtained by averaging over 30 runs. For each run, the malicious nodes are chosen at random such that they are more than 2 hops away from each other. Figure 10 shows the number of packets dropped as a function of simulation time for the 100-node setup with 2 and 4 colluding nodes both with SRPS and without SRPS. Since the number is vastly different in the two cases, they are shown on separate Y-axes, the axis on the left of each figure corresponds to the baseline case (without SRPS) and the axis to the right corresponds to the system using SRPS. In the baseline case, since wormholes are not detected and isolated, the cumulative number of packets dropped continues to increase steadily with time. But in the SRPS case, as wormholes are identified and isolated for good, the cumulative number stabilizes. Notice that the cumulative number of packets dropped grows for some time even after the wormhole is locally isolated, due to the cached routes that contain the wormhole and continue to be used till route timeout occurs. Figure 11 shows a snapshot, at the simulation time of 2000 secs, of the fraction of the total number of packets dropped to the total number of packets sent and the fraction of the total number of routes that involve the wormhole to the total number of routes established. This is shown for for 0-4 compromised nodes for both scenarios -with SRPS and without SRPS. With 0 or 1 compromised node, there is no effect on normal traffic since no wormhole is created. Notice that the relationship between the number of dropped packets and the number of malicious routes is not linear. This is because the route established through the wormhole is more heavily used by data sources due to the aggressive nature of the malicious node at the end of the wormhole. If we track these same output parameters over time, with SRPS, they would tend to zero as no more malicious routes are established or packets dropped, while without SRPS they would reach a steady state as a fixed percentage of traffic continues to be affected by the undetected wormholes. 
Isolation latency
Sim P(detection) Ana P(detection) sim isolation latency Figure 12 : Detection probability and latency with variations in detection confidence index for SRPS Figure 12 bears out the analytical result ( Figure 9 ) for the detection probability as the detection confidence index (γ) is varied with NB = 15 and M= 2. We also show the isolation latency. As γ increases, the detection probability goes down due to the need for alarm reporting by a larger number of guards, in the presence of collisions. Also the isolation latency goes up, though it is very small (less than 30 s) even at the right end of the plot.
Conclusion
We have presented a secure routing protocol, called SRPS, for resource constrained sensor networks. SRPS represents a stand alone lightweight protocol that mitigates all the known attacks 28 namely, traffic blocking, HELLO flood, sinkhole, wormhole, Sybil, rushing, spoofed, altered, and replayed attacks. We present a detailed security analysis of SRPS and show its ability of dealing with each one of these attacks. SRPS exploits novel ideas to achieve, in addition to the end-to-end authentication, an intermediate node verification using the specially generated sequence numbers and sequence number verifications. Neighbor watch and wait-while-collect are used to help in defeating these attacks and establishing multiple disjoint routes.
We present mathematical analysis of the detection coverage in SRPS, and the resource overhead that SRPS requires and show that these requirements are within the available limits for the current sensor technology. Finally we provide simulation results that show the capabilities of SRPS in mitigating the wormhole attack.
